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MONTANA'S TREATMENT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
INTERESTS
Clarence Greenwood
Two separate and distinct property systems exist within the United
States: the community property system and the common law system.
Numerous legal complexities and disputes arise when property is trans-
ferred from one system to another or when there is a change of domicile
by a married couple from a jurisdiction following one system to a juris-
diction following a different system.' For example, will a common law
state recognize the spouses' interests in community property as such
interests are recognized and protected in a community property state?
The importance of this problem and the need for clarification will in-
crease with the increasing mobility of the population.
In Re Hunter's Estate2 involved a facet of this general problem.
This note will review that decision discussing the recognition and pro-
tection the Montana court accorded the community property interests.
It will analyze the decision in terms of basic community property theory
and community property law as it presently exists in the community
property jurisdictions. This note will compare and contrast Hunter's
Estate with other common law states' decisions involving community
property. Finally, the ramifications of Hunter's Estate upon community
property interests in Montana will be analyzed.
THE DECISION
The Hunters, a California couple, purchased Montana realty with
community property funds. Record ownership of the realty was in the
husband's name. Upon his death, he devised his entire interest in the
realty to his wife. The state of Montana sought to collect inheritance
tax upon the whole value of the Montana realty. Thelma Hunter con-
tended, however, that since the Montana realty had been purchased
with community property funds, half of which she had owned under
California law, she owned a half interest in the Montana realty prior
to her husband's devise. Therefore, she contended that only half the
value of the Montana realty should be taxed under the Montana inheri-
tance tax statuteA
The Montana supreme court agreed that the determination of the
dispute depended upon the nature of Mrs. Hunter's interest in the com-
munity property funds. The court ruled, however, that under existing
California law, Mrs. Hunter's interest in the community funds was a
'N. LAY, TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING FOR COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND THi5 MIGRANT
CLIENT, 8-16 (1971) [hereinafter cited as LAY].
2In Re Hunter's Estate, 125 Mont. 315, 236 P.2d 94 (1951) [hereinafter referred to
as Hunter's Estate].
8 REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 91-4401 (1947).
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"mere expectancy" and not a vested interest. Therefore, Mrs. Hunter
received the entire Montana realty by reason of her husband's devise
and would be taxed accordingly.
BASIC COMMUNITY PROPERTY THEORY
Community property is a civil law institution, originating with the
Visigoths who settled southern France and Spain during the decline
of the Roman Empire. 4 Underlying the system is the marital commun-
ity. Generally, community property is described as a system under
which the husband and wife become co-owners of property acquired
during the marriage by either or both through labor, industry, or skill.5
This is in contrast to a modernized common law system of individual
ownership of property by the spouse individually acquiring it. Further-
more, the community property concept of co-ownership has no equal
in the common law pattern of marital rights, for the basic community
property concept is one of co-ownership as "conjugal partners" in ac-
quests and gains. 6
A second basic principle of the community property system is the
division of property into separate and community property. Separate
property is usually defined as property owned by either spouse before
marriage or acquired afterward by gift, devise, or descent.7 Commun-
ity property is defined as all other property acquired after marriage. 8
The spouses' interests in community property is said to be "equal,
present, and existing" in each of the parties of the community upon
the acquisition of the property and regardless of which spouse ac-
quired it.9 This division of the interest in community property is quali-
fied by the fact that the husband is given the right to manage and
control the whole of the community property during the marriage. 10
In no way, however, does this qualification alter the spouses' respective
interests in the community property."'
The ruling in Hunter's Estate is contrary to community property
theory. To rule that a wife's interest in community property is a "mere
expectancy" is to hold also that the husband's interest is a "mere ex-
pectancy"; otherwise, the word "equal" has no meaning.' 2 The theoret-
ical absurdity of such a ruling is manifest.
'2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.2 (A. J. Casner ed. (1952) ; W. DE FUNIAH & M.
VAUGHAN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 2 (2d ed. 1971).
52 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4 at § 7.1.
61d.
7See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE .§ 5107, 5108 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CAL.
CIVIL CODE]; IDAHO CODE § 32-903 (1948) [herinafter cited as ID. C.]; ARIZONA
REVISED STATUTES § 25-213 (1956) [hereinafter cited as A.R.S.].
8See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 5105; ID. C. § 32-906; A.R.S. § 25-211.
*See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 5110; NEVADA REVISED STATUTES § 123.225 (1967).
"oSee, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 5125, 5127; ID. C. § 32-912.
"DE FUNIAK, Commonwealth v. Terjen: Common Law Mutilates Community Property,
43 VA. L. REV. 47, 50 (1957).
"LAY, supra note 1 at 203.
19741
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COMMUNITY INTERESTS IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
STATES: FROM CONFUSION TO ACCORD
The institution of community property presently exists in eight
states: Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada,
Washington, and Idaho. 13 All eight states, with a minor exception in
California,'14 presently recognize the wife's interest in community prop-
erty as vested and equal with the husband's. 15 This is in accord with
basic community property theory. This position, however, was not
arrived at without a good deal of fumbling and contradictory language
in the case law-especially in the California decisions.' 6
The confusion revolving around the rule of "mere expectancy"
originated from a mistranslation of the Spanish word "dominino" to
mean ownership rather than control.17 Thus, in Guice v. Lawrence,'" the
Louisiana supreme court ruled that the husband owned the community
property rather than just having a right to control it. The Louisiana
court subsequently recognized the original error in Guice, reversing itself
in Philips v. Philips.'9 However, by then the California supreme court,
acting in reliance upon the Guice decision, had adopted the rule of "mere
expectancy. '20  This remained the law in California until 1927 when
the legislature enacted a statute stating that the wife's interest in com-
munity property was "existing, present, and equal" with the husband's. 2'
Idaho and New Mexico initially followed California's lead, however,
both subsequently judicially repudiated the rule of "mere expectancy. '22
THE COMMON LAW STATES' TREATMENT OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY INTERESTS: CONFUSION
Although the community property states all presently follow the
rule that the wife's interest is an "equal, present, and existing" interest,
the common law states are in disarray. The present confusion revolves
around California couples who acquire community property in Cali-
"Six additional states: Oklahoma, Ohio, Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Hawaii
(at the time a territory) adopted the community property system between 1939 and
1948 due to a favorable income tax treatment of community income. Since Congress
passed the 1948 statute providing for joint returns, all six states have rejected the
system. LAY, supra note 1 at 13.
"
4A wife's interest in California community property prior to 1927 is a "mere ex-
pectancy." See Spanfelner v. Meyer, 57 Cal. App.2d 786, 124 P.2d 862 (1942).
"Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258, 121 P. 544
(1912); In Re Williams Estate, 40 Nev. 241, 161 P. 741 (1916).
"In Re Williams Estate, 40 Nev. 241, 161 P. 741 (1916).
1 Philips v. Philips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584, 588-589 (1926).
lGuice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226, 227 (1847) [hereinafter referred to as Guice].
"Philips v. Philips, supra note 17.
'Packard v. Arellannes, 17 Cal. 525, 538 (1861).
2CAL. CIVIL CODE § 5110.
'Hall v. Johns, 17 Idaho 224, 228, 105 P. 71 (1912) rev'd., Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho
258, 265, 121 P. 544 (1912); Reade v. DeLea, 14 N.M. 442, 95 P. 131 (1908) rev'd.,
Arnett v. Reades, 220 U.S. 311, 319 (1911).
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fornia and migrate to a common law jurisdiction or transfer the com-
munity property to such a jurisdiction. Much of this confusion is un-
doubtedly attributable to the historical confusion in the California case
law and the use of common law terminology by the California courts
in explaining the community property system.2 3
Hunter's Estate was the first dispute involving California com-
munity property to be settled by a court in a common law jurisdiction.
There, the Montana court ruled that the wife's interest in community
property was a "mere expectancy" despite the theory of community
property and an unequivocal California statute stating otherwise. 24
The next case appeared in Virginia. Commonwealth v. Terjen25
involved a California couple who moved to Virginia and purchased a
home with community funds. Record ownership was placed in Mrs.
Terjen's name. A gift tax return was filed for half the value of the
house by Mr. Terjen.26 The State of Virginia sought to tax the total
value of the house under the gift tax statute. The Terjens, using the
same theory as Mrs. Hunter, 27 contended only half the value of the
house should be taxed. The Virginia supreme court, relying heavily
upon the Montana ruling in Hunter's Estate, likewise adopted the rule
of "mere expectancy" and taxed the Terjen home accordingly. 2
In 1964 In Re Estate of Kessler29 came before the Ohio supreme
court. The case involved the determination of the taxable value of
stocks in Mr. Kessler's estate. The Kesslers had acquired the stock while
living in California and then moved to Ohio. Again, the state sought to
tax the whole value of the stocks, contending that Mrs. Kessler had
no vested interest in the stock prior to her husband's devise. Mrs. Kessler,
again employing the theory used by Mrs. Hunter,30 argued that only half
the value of the stocks should be subject to the succession tax.
The Ohio supreme court rejected the Commissioner's adoption of
the rule of "mere expectancy" stating:
...her interest in the community property vested as of the date
and place of acquisition and, as stated by the California statute,
her interest in such property was present, existing, and equal.'
1234 Op. ATT'Y. GFN. 395 (1924).
"For criticism see Note, 27 TuL. L. REv. 116 (1953).
'Commonwealth v. Tergen, 197 Va. 596, 90 S.E.2d 801 (1956).
tmMr. Tergen owned a half interest in the home, for it was purchased with community
property funds. The record showed that Mrs. Terjen was the sole owner, which meant
that Mr. Tergen had given her his half interest in the home.
"In Re Hunter 's Estate, supra note 2 at 317 and discussion supra.
'The value of the ruling is questionable. The appellee (Tergens) did not appear be-
fore the Virginia supreme court. Possibly this is attributable to the fact that only
$140 worth of tax was involved. See criticism de Funiak, Commonwealth v. Tergen:
Common Law Mutilates Community Property, 43 VA. L. REv. 47 (1957); Note, 42
VA. L. REv. 724 (1956).
'In Re Estate of Kessler, 177 Ohio St. 136, 203 N.E.2d 221 (1964).
'In Re Hunter's Estate, supra note 2 at 317 and discussion supra.
'In Re Estate of Kessler, supra note 29 at 139.
1974]
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Still, Ohio applied the succession tax to the whole value of the stock.
The theory was that although Mrs. Kessler had a vested half interest
in the community property, she received additional incidents of owner-
ship (e.g., such as the right to directly control and manage her interest)
in regard to her half interest upon her husband's death.3 2 It was upon
the transfer of these additional incidents which the succession tax was
imposed, thus making the total value of the stocks taxable.
The only common law jurisdiction not to tax the wife's half interest
in community property is Colorado. People v. Bejarano33 involved the
determination of the taxable value of retirement benefits. The Bejaranos
had acquired the benefits while living in California and Texas. The
controversy again revolved around whether Mrs. Bejarano's half interest
in the benefits vested prior to her husband's death or afterward. Again,
the state's contention was that Mrs. Bejarano had a "mere expectancy"
in the community property which became vested upon her husband's
death. The Colorado supreme court rejected the rule of "mere expect-
ancy" and simply concluded:
It is sufficient answer to this contention to point out that the right
is vested to the extent that the death of the decedent did not under
the present statute give rise to a taxable event.
It is to be noted that two of the common law states adopted the
rule of "mere expectancy" and two rejected it. Three applied a tax and
one did not. Of the decisions, the Colorado ruling is the preferable
one since it is more consistent with the true nature of the community
property interests in theory and in practice. Moreover, it recognizes and
protects the community property interests, affording the owners the
full benefit thereof notwithstanding their change of domicile or trans-
fer of property to a common law state.3"
Of the three common law jurisdictions taxing the wife's interest
in community property, two followed a legally ill-founded theory. Mon-
tana and Virginia not only adopted a theory contrary to the theory
and law of community property, but one which fails to recognize and
protect the spouses' respective interests in community property.3 6 In
Kessler, the Ohio court adopted a theory more in accord with that of
community property.37 The Ohio theory recognizes the respective inter-
ests in community property, but does not allow the owners the full
"For a discussion of the constitutionality of a federal tax based upon this theory,
see Fernadez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
'People v. Bejarano, 145 Colo. 304, 358 P.2d 866 (1961).
"Id. at 869.
'LAY, supra note 1 at 205.
'For example, a wife from California loses her vested interest in community property
once it is transferred into a jurisdiction following the rule of "mere expectancy."
S'For criticism of this approach, see LAY, supra note 1 at 205.
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benefit of the interests when there is a transfer of property to a com-
mon law state.38
RAMIFICATIONS OF HUNTER'S ESTATE
The Hunter decision raises two serious problems. First, will the
rule of "mere expectancy" be followed by the Montana court in a
dispute involving the determination of the spouses' respective interests
in community property transferred to Montana?39 If so, it would be
possible for a California husband to deprive his wife of her interest in
community property by simply transferring the property to Montana.
Second, Hunter's Estate places a cloud of uncertainty over community
property for the Montana estate planner. How the property will pass
upon the death of a spouse and the applicability of the inheritance tax
both depend upon the characterization of the interests in the commun-
ity property. Because of the questionableness of Hunter's Estate and the
confusion existing in other common law states, possibly the best approach
here would be to transfer the community property into a common law
form of ownership. This would insure the predictability of ownership
for planning purposes.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the decision in Hunter's Estate was legally and
theoretically ill-founded. The decision is contrary to the modern trend
of property law, the basic theory of community property, and the law of
community property in the community property jurisdictions. It is also
a haunting specter to couples with community property interests who
move from California to a common law jurisdiction, to estate planners
who come in contact with an estate containing community property,
and to those members of the women's rights movement who are calling
for the adoption of the community property system as a more equitable
property system.
8For example, the community property jurisdictions do not impose an inheritance tax
upon the wife's half interest in community property upon the husband's death, but
Ohio did. See, e.g., ID. C. § 14-401.
0A second major area of litigation involving community property is the determination
of the spouses' respective interests. Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848);
Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93, 233 P. 477 (1925); LAY, supra note 1 at 122.
1974]
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